Durkheim, Emile. Division of Labor in Society
Book 3 Chp2 and 3
In Book 3, Durkheim discusses the abnormal forms. In chapter 2, Durkheim discusses the abnormal form of division of labor – forced division of labor. According to Durkheim, assigning the lower class roles that are not according to their will and not satisfied with creates conflicts. This therefore requires change social order so that one does something agreeable to him. He argues that for the division of labor to create social solidarity, it is not enough that everyone have a task but the task must be agreeable to him. If the division of labor produces unrest, it is because the distribution of social functions does not correspond to the distribution of natural abilities. Constraint binds people to their functions, and only a troubled form of solidarity can exist (311). From my perspective, Durkheim assumes that people have no capacity to act on their external environment. People make choices and constraints alone cannot confine people to their undesired functions. People can influence the environment to obtain a desired situation although the external environment can also directly impact of them, which could be constraining.
He goes further to assert that normally, labor is divided according to the distribution of aptitude in society. The division of labor produces social solidarity when it arises spontaneously (312). Perfect Spontaneity corresponds to absolute equality in the external conditions of struggle for a position in the division of labor. Constraint occurs when this struggle becomes impossible (313). Perfect spontaneity cannot exist in any society. Inequalities build up through time. For instance, the hereditary transmission of wealth makes the external conditions of the 'struggle' very unequal. The 'higher' the society, the less these inequalities exist (313-4). I disagree with Durkheim’s statement that the higher the society, the less these inequalities exist. In industrialized society, inequalities still exist due to unequal access to means of production. I totally disagree that wealth is hereditary. Even those born by poor families learn better ways to survive in society. Later in the books he argues that injustice causes birth of the poor and rich but this does not solely explain cause of social inequalities. Social structures are contributing factors.
Durkheim assets that in an organic society, the sentiments held in common do not possess a great deal of strength to keep the individual bound to the group. Subversive tendencies emerge more readily than in mechanical societies. Hence, in organized societies it is indispensable that the division of labor attains the goal of spontaneity. These societies should attempt to eliminate all external inequalities. They cannot sustain solidarity unless their constituent parts are solidly linked (315-6). Equality in the external conditions of the struggle is needed to secure each individual to his function and to link these functions with each other (316). This argument draws Durkheim into a discussion on the importance of equality in contracts. He states that contracts necessarily develop with the division of labor. There is a consensus of a certain kind that is expressed in contracts and represents an important factor of collective thought in higher societies. He goes ahead to state that contracts are a regulatory system and can enhance solidarity only if there is justice among parities in exchange.
Durkheim also contends that 'there can be no rich or poor by birth without there being unjust contracts' (319). These injustices are found less often in less advanced societies, where contractual relations are less developed. Yet as labor becomes more divided up and the social doctrine weakens, these injustices become more unbearable and people start creating contracts to make relationships fairer. Therefore contracts regulate social life so that people do not take advantage of each other. Regulation generates liberty and equality.
In chapter 3 of book 3, Durkheim discusses the last abnormal form in industrial society, which is wastage. This occurs when there is lack of coordination of functions, leading to disorder. The ‘organs’ of the system do not function smoothly and continuously together to furnish efficient production of social solidarity. Although the division of labor might be highly developed, it is very poorly integrated. This does not always occur because there is a lack of a regulatory organ, but because the regulator does not distribute work in such a way that each individual is kept sufficiently busy to increase the functional activity of every worker (324).
Every increase in functional activity can create an increase in social solidarity. When functions of each organism become more active, they become more continuous. When all functions of the organisms become even more active, continuity of each one of them increases even more, creating solid ties and thus increasing solidarity. He states: As actions are more solidly linked to one another, they become more dependent on one another (326). The more individuals work in a society, the more each individual will specialize. At the same time, each worker must increase his activity to meet the needed amount of product. Hence, a second reason for why the division of labor fosters social cohesion: 'It fosters the unity of the organization by the very fact that it adds to its life (328).'
Monday, March 9, 2009
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Organic solidarity and Contractual Solidarity
This is an overview of chapter 7 (Organic solidarity and Contractual Solidarity). It highlights some of the key issues in this chapter. However it lacks an in-depth analysis of the issues raised by Durkheim and Spencer.
In this chapter, Durkheim criticizes Spencer’s conceptions of organic solidarity and contracts. This critic forms the basis of Durkheim’s discussion. Spencer claims that industrial solidarity is spontaneous and that there is no need for a coercive apparatus to produce or maintain it. Social harmony is simply established of its own accord. Durkheim asserts that, were this is the case, the sphere of social action would diminish greatly because it would no longer be needed except to enforce negative solidarity (149). I argue that human beings are dynamic and their actions are influenced by external events. In the free capitalists’ society, external measures actively influence people’s action. Thus social occurrences may not be spontaneous but are driven by other external forces like political and economic factors.
Spencer also argues that the normal form of exchange is contract. For this reason, the extent of central authority diminishes. As freedom of action increases, contracts become more general. This general social contract requires the free agreement of human wills and is irreconcilable with the division of labor. However, Durkheim argues states that this type of spontaneous, general social contract has never existed. Societies are spontaneously contractual only to the extent that an individual chooses to remain in the society in which he was born, and hence he abides by that society's rules. For Spencer, society would be no more than the establishment of relationships between individuals exchanging the products of their labor without any social action intervening to regulate that exchange (152).
Durkheim disputes Spencer by claiming that social intervention is on the rise. The legal obligations which society imposes on its members are becoming more and more complex. restitutory law is growing. If social intervention no longer has the effect of imposing certain uniform practices on everybody, it consists more in defining and regulating the special relationship between the different social functions (153).
Spencer agrues that not every kind of control has decreased, just positive control. However, Durkheim asserts that positive control is far from disappearing; in fact, restitutory law is continually growing (154). In the current situation, Durkheim and Spencer could be right but their arguments are context specific. Currently, with the increase in deviation from ‘normal behavior’, restitutory law is increasing. In Uganda were Kinships still prevail, repressive law still manifests to control people cord of conduct. However, restitutory law still dominates; people are forced to comply with government systems which may not be according to their own will. This could confirm Durkheim’s argument.
Durkheim next states that although Spencer is correct in claiming that contractual relationships are multiplied as society is divided up, he has failed to note that non-contractual relationships are developing at the same time (155). Durkheim argues that 'private law,' typically contractual, is really quite public. For instance, marriage and adoption, although private matters, were formerly endorsed by the church and are now endorsed by civil authority (155). As domestic obligations become more numerous, they tend to take on a private character. The role played by contract is continually decreasing, and social control over the way obligations are regulated is increasing. This is due to the progressive disappearance of segmentary organization. Everything segmentary is increasingly absorbed into larger society.
The contracts that remain are entirely removed from the sphere of individual negotiation and are submitted to the regulatory force of society. Contractual law exists to determine the legal consequences of our acts which we have not settled beforehand. It expresses the normal conditions for attaining equilibrium and constrains us to respect obligations for which we have not contracted. It is the role of society to determine what contractual conditions are capable of being executed, and if necessary, to restore them to their normal form (162). And just as society plays a role in shaping contracts, contracts play a role in shaping society. An extensive network of relationships which contribute to social solidarity can stem from contracts.
Social life is derived from a dual source: the similarity of individual consciousnesses and the social division of labor. The similarity of consciousnesses gives rise to rules, which under the threat of repressive measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices. The more pronounced the similarity, the more completely social life is mixed up with religious life. On the other hand, the division of labor gives rise to legal rules that determine the nature of a divided up society, but punishment for law breakers in this case involves only reparative measures which lack any expiatory character (172). In organic society, members' dependence on the state continues to grow. As a result, they are continually reminded of their common solidarity.
Durkheim argues that altruism is not Spencer's conception of an ornament to social life, but it is the fundamental basis of social life. Every society is a moral society, because men cannot cohabitate without agreeing and cooperating. Hence, even societies characterized by organic solidarity and the division of labour are moral because cooperation has an intrinsic morality. This morality grows as the individual personality grows stronger (as opposed to in mechanical solidarity when morality depends on common sentiment) (173-4).
There are 'two great currents of social life.' The first has origins in social similarity and is segmentary. It gradually becomes overshadowed by the second type of society, which is composed of individual differences and organic cooperation. Nonetheless, the segmentary structure never completely disappears (174).
In this chapter, Durkheim criticizes Spencer’s conceptions of organic solidarity and contracts. This critic forms the basis of Durkheim’s discussion. Spencer claims that industrial solidarity is spontaneous and that there is no need for a coercive apparatus to produce or maintain it. Social harmony is simply established of its own accord. Durkheim asserts that, were this is the case, the sphere of social action would diminish greatly because it would no longer be needed except to enforce negative solidarity (149). I argue that human beings are dynamic and their actions are influenced by external events. In the free capitalists’ society, external measures actively influence people’s action. Thus social occurrences may not be spontaneous but are driven by other external forces like political and economic factors.
Spencer also argues that the normal form of exchange is contract. For this reason, the extent of central authority diminishes. As freedom of action increases, contracts become more general. This general social contract requires the free agreement of human wills and is irreconcilable with the division of labor. However, Durkheim argues states that this type of spontaneous, general social contract has never existed. Societies are spontaneously contractual only to the extent that an individual chooses to remain in the society in which he was born, and hence he abides by that society's rules. For Spencer, society would be no more than the establishment of relationships between individuals exchanging the products of their labor without any social action intervening to regulate that exchange (152).
Durkheim disputes Spencer by claiming that social intervention is on the rise. The legal obligations which society imposes on its members are becoming more and more complex. restitutory law is growing. If social intervention no longer has the effect of imposing certain uniform practices on everybody, it consists more in defining and regulating the special relationship between the different social functions (153).
Spencer agrues that not every kind of control has decreased, just positive control. However, Durkheim asserts that positive control is far from disappearing; in fact, restitutory law is continually growing (154). In the current situation, Durkheim and Spencer could be right but their arguments are context specific. Currently, with the increase in deviation from ‘normal behavior’, restitutory law is increasing. In Uganda were Kinships still prevail, repressive law still manifests to control people cord of conduct. However, restitutory law still dominates; people are forced to comply with government systems which may not be according to their own will. This could confirm Durkheim’s argument.
Durkheim next states that although Spencer is correct in claiming that contractual relationships are multiplied as society is divided up, he has failed to note that non-contractual relationships are developing at the same time (155). Durkheim argues that 'private law,' typically contractual, is really quite public. For instance, marriage and adoption, although private matters, were formerly endorsed by the church and are now endorsed by civil authority (155). As domestic obligations become more numerous, they tend to take on a private character. The role played by contract is continually decreasing, and social control over the way obligations are regulated is increasing. This is due to the progressive disappearance of segmentary organization. Everything segmentary is increasingly absorbed into larger society.
The contracts that remain are entirely removed from the sphere of individual negotiation and are submitted to the regulatory force of society. Contractual law exists to determine the legal consequences of our acts which we have not settled beforehand. It expresses the normal conditions for attaining equilibrium and constrains us to respect obligations for which we have not contracted. It is the role of society to determine what contractual conditions are capable of being executed, and if necessary, to restore them to their normal form (162). And just as society plays a role in shaping contracts, contracts play a role in shaping society. An extensive network of relationships which contribute to social solidarity can stem from contracts.
Social life is derived from a dual source: the similarity of individual consciousnesses and the social division of labor. The similarity of consciousnesses gives rise to rules, which under the threat of repressive measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices. The more pronounced the similarity, the more completely social life is mixed up with religious life. On the other hand, the division of labor gives rise to legal rules that determine the nature of a divided up society, but punishment for law breakers in this case involves only reparative measures which lack any expiatory character (172). In organic society, members' dependence on the state continues to grow. As a result, they are continually reminded of their common solidarity.
Durkheim argues that altruism is not Spencer's conception of an ornament to social life, but it is the fundamental basis of social life. Every society is a moral society, because men cannot cohabitate without agreeing and cooperating. Hence, even societies characterized by organic solidarity and the division of labour are moral because cooperation has an intrinsic morality. This morality grows as the individual personality grows stronger (as opposed to in mechanical solidarity when morality depends on common sentiment) (173-4).
There are 'two great currents of social life.' The first has origins in social similarity and is segmentary. It gradually becomes overshadowed by the second type of society, which is composed of individual differences and organic cooperation. Nonetheless, the segmentary structure never completely disappears (174).
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